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Abstract
This  paper  is  concerned  with  Kierkegaard’s  the  notion  of  faith.  In  reading
Kierkegaard’s works one is never sure if they are encountering the real Kierkegaard’s
thoughts or merely his pseudonyms. To divine what Kierkegaard means by the notion
of faith is not an easy task, as we encounter different perspectives of faith along with
his pseudonyms. In this paper I want to focus on his idea on faith through my reading of
two  pseudonyms;  Johannes  Climacus  and  Johannes  de  Silentio  from  the  books;
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (CUP) and  Fear and
Trembling (FT).  This paper will first describe the notion of faith from Climacus’ point
of view, and secondly on the movement to the  leap of faith from Silentio’s point of
view.  Lastly I will reflect on the difficulties and challenges in reading these two works
for those who wish to become Christian.
‘Were your faith the size of a mustard seed you could say to this
mulberry tree, “Be uprooted and planted in the sea”, and it would
obey you. (Luke, 17: 6) 
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I
Faith  is  one  of  the  main  themes  of  Kierkegaard’s  two works,  Concluding
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments and Fear and Trembling, and his
account of faith aims at answering his own question about the meaning of human
existence.  In the Journal Kierkegaard says, “What I really need is to get clear about
what I am to do….to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial
thing is to find a truth that is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to
live and die” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p.8).  It is clear that the idea for which he is willing
to live and die for is faith.  But what does Kierkegaard mean by faith? His account of
faith is closely related to his biography.  And he is one of the philosophers whose
philosophy has essential connection to his real life.  Likewise his philosophy aims at
the meaning of his personal existence.  He does not refer to a general conception of
truth,  a  truth for  everyone,  but,  “a truth  for  me.”   This  is  also a  response to  the
philosophical situation of nineteenth century Europe.  Many thinkers inquire into the
objective truth, and consider man in general, but the existing individual is overlooked.
But for Kierkegaard,  human beings are first  existing individuals who have a will,
through  which  they  can  decide  what  they  want  to  become,  and  could  not  be
characterized in advance.  
For Kierkegaard, the existing individual could not be reduced to only a part of
any system of thought,  or any organized religion or formal social  structure.   This
individuality does not exist only in statement or proposition, but in real existence as
human  person.   Speculative  thinkers  often  overlook  the  importance  of  individual
persons  and  view them too  abstractly.   According  to  Levinas,  the  irreducible  of
individuality is one of Kierkegaard’s contributions to European thought.  He says, 
The  strong  conception  of  existence  which  was  Kierkegaard’s  contribution  to
European  thought  insists  on  two  basic  points.   The  first  is  that  human
subjectivity, together with its dimension of interiority, needs to be maintained as
an absolute, as something separate but located on this side of objective Being
rather than beyond it.  But secondly, and paradoxically, the irreducibility of the
subject must be protected – on the basis of pre-philosophical experience – from
the threat of idealism, even if it was idealism that first accorded a philosophical
status to subjectivity. (Levinas, 1998, p.26)
Many philosophers, from its Greek beginnings up to the nineteenth century,
had attempted to reach, through their pursuit of objective truth, a logical systematic
explanation to take account of all things.  For Kierkegaard, speculative philosophy
seems to reach its  culmination  with Hegelian  dialectic.   Everything,  according to
Hegel, could be explained logically within his system of thought, epitomized in his
statement:  What is  rational is real,  what is  real is rational.  And this  account of
rationality could be applied even to the religious sphere, which means that nothing
could  escape  his  rational  system  of  thought.  Incomprehensibility  is  attributed  to
human  ignorance  which  has  not  yet  attained  the  transcendental  intuition.   This
intuition will move us from our subjective limited reality to the objective reality, or
totality.   And everything exists as part  of this  totality.   The existing individual  is
reduced  to  a  part  under  the  shadow  of  the  whole  system.   The  striving  for  the
objective truth moves humans as existing individuals to be human in general, or in the
words,  the  “human  being”  is  separated  from  individual  human  beings.   For
Kierkegaard, a resistance against the objective truth of speculative thinkers, especially
Hegel, has to be awakened to bring “human being” back to existing individual, so that
they can find their home in the world, not in the system. 
Kierkegaard, through Climacus, says: “Speculators cease to be human beings,
individual existing human beings, and ‘en famille’ (as a family) become all sorts of
things?  If not, one is certainly obliged to stop with the paradox, since it is grounded
in and is the expression for precisely this, that the eternal, essential truth relates itself
to  existing  individuals  with  the  summons  that  they  go  further  and  further  in  the
inwardness of faith” (CUP, VII 183).  Kierkegaard seems to love the paradox of life.
He  aims  at  preserving  the  paradox  as  a  paradox,  not  to  understand  it,  but  to
understand that it is a paradox.  By no means does he reject speculative thought; he
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just  tries  to  show  that  there  must  be  some  sphere  independent  from speculative
reasoning.   Speculative  thinkers,  according to  Climacus,  are like dancers  who are
good dancers in their own way.  A good dancer sometimes has a good leap to perform
for the audience.  But many speculative thinkers are like dancers, who believe they
can fly.  Climacus, in the Postscript, rejects this:
If a dancer could leap very high, we would admire him, but if he wanted to give
the impression what he could fly – even though he could leap higher than any
dancer had ever  leapt  before – let  laughter overtake him.   Leaping means  to
belong essentially to the earth and to respect the law of gravity so that the leap is
merely the momentary, but flying means to be set free from telluric conditions,
something  that  is  reserved exclusively for  winged creatures,  perhaps  also  for
inhabitants of the moon, perhaps – and perhaps that is also where the system will
at long last find its true reader.  To be a human being has been abolished, and
every speculative thinker confuses himself with humankind, whereby he becomes
something infinitely great and nothing at all.  (CUP, VII 102)
Hegel,  according  to  Climacus,  might  have  been  a  good  dancer  if  he  was
content merely to dance but not to try to fly.  To fly would mean to understand faith.
Rationality, for traditional thinkers from the middle ages to the Enlightenment, is the
proper  means  to  help man understand everything  including their  religious  beliefs.
God as the infinite also is the object of rationalization for many thinkers.  This is the
long last temptation of human thought to lift up, or in the other word ‘to fly’, to the
infinite  through  finite  thought.   For  Climacus,  the  infinite  could  not  be
comprehensible with finite human thought.  The infinite is beyond the finite, and this
gap could not be bridged through rationality.  Hegel is a good exemplar of a dancer
who attempts to fly,  fly without wings for the infinite.  Climacus wants to remind
Hegel to content himself with being a good dancer.  For Butler, “If one tries to think
the infinite, one has already made the infinite finite….The infinite can be affirmed
nonrationally and, hence, passionately, at the limits of thought, that is, at the limits of
Hegelianism” (Butler, 1993, p.375).  The limits of Hegelian system bring Climacus
reconsider  again  what  an  account  of  faith  is  supposed  to  be.   Rationality  is  not
supposed to be the tool to help man understand faith.  For him, the notion of faith that
can be grasped by reason is always a misconception.  Faith, according to him, could
not be comprehended through any system of thought.  On one hand, faith is related to
his definition of truth: “Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty,
held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the
highest truth there is  for an existing person” (CUP, VII 170).  But this definition
includes uncertainty and paradox. As such the definition of faith does not grasp faith:
Without risk, no faith.  Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of
inwardness  and  the  objective  uncertainty.   If  I  am  able  to  apprehend  God
objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith.  If
I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it that I hold fast the
objective uncertainty,  see to  it  that  in  the objective uncertainty I  am “out  on
70,000 fathoms of water” and still have faith. (CUP, VII 170-171)
Climacus wants to show us that to intellectually apprehend God is, at the same
time, to remove our faith, so that faith will have no place in the religious dimension.
We still have faith because we could not comprehend God intellectually,  and then
faith  becomes  the  stairway  to  lift  up  man  to  God,  towards  this  absolute
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incomprehensibility.   What  man  needs  at  this  stage  is  to  leap  into  the  objective
uncertainty.   And this  leap requires the total  risk as an adventure into the unseen
which is absolutely unknown.  Faith, in this sense, has to come out of our passion for
the infinite.  Just as Climacus shocks the traditional conception of Christianity when
he views faith as the highest attainment that nothing can go beyond.  For those who
want to explain something beyond faith might not agree with him in this point, and
some thinkers might not accept his view of faith in form of the infinite passion.  Many
thinkers and theologians may prefer to develop reason as the gift from God to open
the  veil  of  mystery,  and  firmly  claim  of  all  mysteries  sooner  or  later  will  be
understandable.  He challenges all who use rationality to account for objective truth,
and even theologians who want to postion faith within a systematic theology.  For
Climacus, faith that can be understandable is not faith.  To understand objectively and
with certainty requires no risk, and faith has no place there.
Faith always requires risk as Climacus says: “Without risk, no faith.”  With
risk,  faith  requires  a  personal  infinite  passion,  and  those  who have  faith  have  to
commit  themselves  fully  into  this  passion  despite  the  greatest  uncertainty.   For
Climacus, “Faith is the objective uncertainty with the repulsion of the absurd, held
fast in the passion of inwardness, which is the relation of inwardness intensified to its
highest.  This formula fits only the one who have faith, no one else, not even a lover,
or an enthusiast, or a thinker, but solely and only the one who has faith, who relates
himself  to  the  absolute  paradox”  (CUP,  VII  532).   Those  who  are  approach  the
infinite  with  objective  certainty merely try to  know the infinite  intellectually,  and
commitment is not a requirement for them.  But for those who live their lives with
faith will commit themselves to the infinite with infinite passion even without any
guarantee  for  their  faith.   A  man  with  faith  is  a  person  who  is  not  afraid  of
uncertainty, and the more uncertainty he encounters the more he commits himself to
faith.  A man with faith is a man who is ready to accept the greatest paradox, even if
this paradox leads to absurdity.  What does he mean by this paradox?  Climacus says,
When the eternal truth relates itself to an existing person, it becomes the paradox.
Through the objective uncertainty and ignorance, the paradox thrusts away in the
inwardness of the existing person.   But  since the paradox is  not  in  itself  the
paradox, it does not thrust away intensely enough, for without risk, no faith; the
more  risk,  the  more  faith;  the  more  objective  reliability,  the  less  inwardness
(since inwardness is subjectivity); the less objective reliability, the deeper is the
possible inwardness.  When the paradox itself is the paradox, it thrusts away by
virtue of the absurd, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith. (CUP,
VII 176)
And what does Climacus mean by the absurd? He replies:
What,  then,  is  the absurd? The absurd is  that  the eternal  truth has come into
existence in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up,
etc.,  has  come  into  existence  exactly  as  an  individual  human  being,
indistinguishable  from  any  other  human  being,  inasmuch  as  all  immediate
recognizability is pre-Socratic paganism and from the Jewish point of view is
idolatry. (CUP, VII 176)
Is it possible for a man with reason to understand this paradox?  If faith is the
highest attainment of human being, then to remain at the level of human intellect is
not enough.  For Climacus, this paradox is not something that can be understood, so
4
ultimately  we  can  only  accept  this  paradox  as  a  paradox.   This  seems  to  echo
Socratic’s  irony:  to  know  that  I  do  not  know.   And  this  paradox  shows  us  the
impossibility to understand how the eternal truth comes into existence in the temporal
as the infinite coming to be the finite.  This is absurd, just as the Christian belief that
God comes  into  existence  as  an  existing  individual.   From this  absurd,  Climacus
strongly insists on the fundamental gap between reason and faith.  Faith is not the
object for rational activity, and reason has its own place to play, but not in religious
belief.  Some may question this irrationality of faith.  For Westphal, “It is not reason
as such that is opposed to faith but modes of human reason that have forgotten their
limits as human and have lapsed into self-deification” (Westphal, 1998, p.112).  But
Climacus should not be considered an irrationalist.   Reason is not something to be
denied. It is a gift from God, as St. Augustine claimed, but we should let it play its
own role, and not extend beyond its own power.  
For Climacus, the dancer is not a person who can fly.  Reason is not the key to
faith.  Instead it is our infinite passion of the infinite, coupled with our acceptance of
paradox and the absurd, which lifts us to the level of faith.  Christianity was very
strange and peculiar to Greek and Jewish people precisely because of this absurdity.
And this absurdity has never left Christianity as long as it accepts the paradox of God
coming into existence as an existing individual.  According to Climacus, a man who
wants to understand faith is called a “comedian”.
Or there is a man who says he has faith, but now he wants to make his faith clear
to himself; he wants to understand himself in his faith.  Now the comedy begins
again.   The object  of  faith  becomes  almost  probable,  it  becomes  as  good as
probable,  it  becomes  to  a  high  degree  and  exceedingly  probable.   He  has
finished; he dares to say of himself that he does not believe as shoemakers and
tailors or other simple folk do but that he has also understood himself  in his
believing.  What wondrous understanding!  On the contrary, he has learned to
know something different about faith than he believed and has learned to know
that he no longer has faith, since he almost knows, as good as knows, to a high
degree and exceedingly almost knows. (CUP, VII 211)
Before faith, no one understands better than any other, whether shoemaker,
tailor, or professor.  We have to understand that it is not understandable.  Climacus,
again, says: “The person who understands the paradox will, misunderstanding, forget
that  Christianity  is  the  absolute  paradox  (just  as  its  newness  is  the  paradoxical
newness) precisely because it annihilates a possibility (the analogies of paganism, an
eternal becoming-of-the-deity)  as an illusion and turns it into actuality” (CUP, VII
506).  Any dancer who takes a fine leap, seemingly wanting to fly at last will come
back to the floor.  A flying dancer is ridiculous and becomes a comedian. It is mere
fantasy or comedy.  What a man can do is only to take a leap, and this leap is taken
not through reason, but the infinite passion.  And this infinite passion makes human
move beyond the limits of reason. For Gardiner, “In every case faith demands, not
just  a  leap,  but  a  leap  into  the  rational  unthinkable  which  presupposes  divine
assistance” (Gardiner, 1988, p.76). The leap here, according to Gardiner, seems to be
the leap made by faith, and it is not the intellectual activity.  It is the miracle.  It is the
highest attainment of human life and there is nothing beyond this. 
II
Kierkegaard, in the book Fear and Trembling, provides us a narrative through
his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio concerning the story of Abraham from Genesis
5
22.  Abraham is the great father of faith for all Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions.
However, Silentio talks about Abraham only in the Christian context. The point is:
how Abraham acts in response to God who asks him to sacrifice his beloved son to
God?  And we may have further question about how we understand Abraham’s act
relating to his faith, and what faith is.  For those who are familiar with this story may
take it for granted like a sermon about Abraham and his faith.  But Silentio leads us to
reread again how Abraham acts on his belief in God to sacrifice his only beloved son
Isaac  with  his  conviction  that  he  will  get  Isaac  back.   How  do  we  understand
Abraham?  Silentio, in  Fear and Trembling, begins the Preface with this statement:
“Not only in the business world but also in the world of ideas, our age stages ein
wirklicher Ausverkauf (a real sale)” (FT, III 57).  Many ideas concerning faith are
oversimplified and easy, like a clearance sale at a supermarket.  Any easy answer as
we  always  hear  from a  sermon  might  not  dig  deep  enough  into  the  paradox  of
Abraham’s faith: to sacrifice Isaac and to receive Isaac back.  With ethical norms, it
may  shock  the  people  who  hear  this  story  suggesting  that  Abraham would  be  a
murderer.  He is going to kill, or to sacrifice Isaac as an offering to God.  Silentio
recognizes  the  paradox of  this  story by extending  it  to  other  persons  who would
perform the same act like Abraham.  
If faith cannot make it a holy act to be willing to murder his son, then let the
same  judgment  be  passed  on  Abraham  as  on  everyone  else….The  ethical
expression  for  what  Abraham did  is  that  he  meant  to  sacrifice  Isaac  –  but
precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person sleepless, and
yet without this anxiety Abraham is not who he is….In other words, if faith is
taken away by becoming Nul and Nichts, all that remains is the brutal fact that
Abraham meant to murder Isaac, which is easy enough for anyone to imitate if he
does not have faith – that is, the faith that makes it difficult for him. (FT, III 82) 
What is supposed to be the ethical norm to justify Abraham’s act in this case?
Because of faith, or only faith that makes Abraham to be the father of faith, not a
murderer.  How could we understand this event on the mount in the land of Moriah?
Along the way to Moriah, there is no conversation left for us, and no one knows what
Abraham  thinks.   Abraham  was  thrown  into  the  absolute  paradox  which  is
unspeakable for the other.  He said nothing to Sarah, his wife, and not fully answered
to Isaac by the question: Where is the lamb for the burnt offering?  This is Abraham’s
answer: ‘My son, God himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering’.  How
could he explain to Isaac that God demands his life?  This story of ‘the binding of
Isaac’ is not only Isaac alone, but for Mark C. Taylor:  “The binding of Isaac is a
figure for other bindings.  This narrative might better be entitled: “The binding of
Abraham.”  The binding of the son repeats and extends the binding of the father, even
as it seems to break the tie that binds the two together as one” (Taylor, 1993, p.76).
This binding does not mean only in physical body that is bound but it links to other
questions like human relationship, freedom, rationality, and moral law.  As the father
who loves his only son, Abraham will perform an act that breaks up his relationship to
his son.  And he will break the moral law that binds all men to live together in society
because of God’s command.  
Abraham  occupies  a  place  no  one  knows  what  he  thinks,  and  no  one
understands what he is going to do.  Some may question him in the manner that he
negotiated with God for Sodom and Gomorrah: “Are you going to destroy the just
man with the sinner?” “Will the judge of the whole earth not administer justice?”
(Gen 18: 23, 25).  He dares to raise questions to God for Sodom and Gomorrah, but in
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the case of his own beloved son Isaac, he keeps silence.  “Here I am” is the absolute
answer for a man of faith like Abraham.  Why does Abraham not ask God for his only
son  and  himself?  For  Abraham,  his  faith  might  lead  him  to  accept  the  angel’s
statement, “for nothing is impossible to God” (Luke 1:37).  To sacrifice Isaac and to
receive Isaac back is not understandable for man, that is why Silentio states: “In order
to perceive the prodigious paradox of faith, a paradox that makes a murder into a holy
and God-pleasing act, a paradox that gives Isaac back to Abraham again, which no
thought can grasp, because faith begins precisely where thought stops” (FT, III 103).
 I repeat here again:  faith begins precisely where thought stops.  Along the
way to the mount in the land of Moriah, Abraham takes with him not only fire, wood,
two servants, Isaac, but also faith.  Because of his faith, he left everything else behind
and keeps faith in his blood and bones as he always answers to God: “Here I am.”  He
is ready for everything that God commands.  About his character, Silentio expresses,
“By faith Abraham emigrated from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the
promised land.  He left one thing behind, took one thing along: he left behind his
worldly understanding, and he took along his faith”(FT, III 69).  For Silentio, “faith
begins precisely where thought stops,” it is by no means to his firmly assertion about
the contradiction between faith and thinking.  On the contrary, faith itself begins only
when  thinking  stops.   Some  may  interpret  faith  begins  when thinking  is  limited.
When thinking  stops,  doubt  also  cast  away from us.   As far  as  we are  thinking,
questioning, doubting, faith is not there.  Abraham lives his faith in his real life, not
only in proposition or in any system of thought.  Abraham never doubt in sacrificing
Isaac and his beloved son never willbe lost because “for nothing is impossible to
God.”  For Silentio, if Abraham doubts, he would do something else, as Silentio says:
But  Abraham had faith  and did  not  doubt;  he  believed the  preposterous.   If
Abraham had doubted, then he would have done something else, something great
and glorious,  for  how could Abraham do anything else but  what is great  and
glorious!  He  would  have  gone  to  Mount  Moriah,  he  would  have  split  the
firewood, lit the fire, drawn the knife.  He would have cried out to God, “Reject
not this sacrifice; it is not the best that I have, that I know very well, for what is
an old man compared with the child of promise, but it is the best I can give you.
Let Isaac never find this out so that he may take comfort in his youth.” He would
have thrust the knife into his own breast.  He would have been admired in the
world, and his name would never be forgotten; but it is one thing to be admired
and another to become a guiding star that saves the anguished. (FT, III 73)
If  Abraham begins  to  doubt  and decide  to  sacrifice  his  life  instead  of  his
beloved son, he might be great like any other great hero who sacrifices himself for his
beloved person.  His name will be honored and immortal, and becomes the story from
generation to generation.  But he has faith, and this faith is the absurd for anyone else.
How could we believe in Abraham sacrificing his son and receiving his son back
again?  When he begs God for Sodom and Gomorrah, it is understandable.  It is his
love of just people as one human being love for mankind.  But in the case of Isaac, we
can only stand with fear and trembling before him.  People tend to give this story only
lip service and oversimplify its reference to faith, like a fairy tale.  But for Silentio,
faith leaves him in silence.  For him, his difficulty to understand Hegel is not the same
as  his  inability  to  grasp  Abraham’s  faith.  He  says,  “Thinking  about  Abraham is
another  matter,  however;  then  I  am  shattered….I  stretch  every  muscle  to  get  a
perspective, and at the very instant I become paralyzed” (FT, III 84).  To understand
Hegel,  according  to  Silentio,  is  possible  if  we  take  time  considering  Hegelian
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philosophy, but not the case of Abraham.  It is always beyond our penetration.  At that
stage of faith, no one else except Abraham stands alone before God.  Faith is not just
a consistent set of propositions in a complete system of thought, but it exists where
“thinking stops.”  Faith is not an object of our intellect.  It is beyond the category of
reason.  It is the inward experience of God.  It is not just a short story where it ceases
to be when that story comes to an end.  It does not end after Abraham receives Isaac
back.   His  response  “Here  I  am”  is  always  and  everywhere  for  God  from  the
beginning to the end.  His relationship to God is anything, anywhere, anytime, and
nothing could separate him from God, even his beloved son.  Abraham follows the
call of God in his own vocation.  Each one has each own vocation to respond to God.
It means that every one can be like Abraham in faith, not in his particular trial of faith.
Kellenberger insists, “What makes Abraham the father of faith is his faith, not his trial
of faith” (Kellenberger, 1997, p.48).  We can see many great persons in the history of
mankind and the different criteria to justify their greatness.  According to Silentio,
what is the criterion to justify the greatness of Abraham?  Let us read his Speech in
Praise of Abraham:
No! No one who was great in the world will be forgotten, but everyone was great
in his own way,  and everyone in proportion to the greatness of that which he
loved.  He who loved himself became great by virtue of himself, and he who
loved other men became great by his devotedness, but he who loved God became
the greatest of all….There was one who was great by virtue of his power, and
one who was great by virtue of his wisdom, and one who was great by virtue of
his hope, and one who was great by virtue of his love, but Abraham was the
greatest of all, great by that power whose strength is powerlessness, great by that
wisdom whose secret is foolishness, great by that hope whose form is madness,
great by the love that is hatred to oneself. (FT, III 69)
Silentio gives us an account of the degree of greatness, and where his criterion
comes  from:  he  who  loves  God  became  greater  than  all;  he  who  expects  the
impossible became greater than all; he who strives with God became greater than all;
and greater than all was the one who believes in God.  And this, for Silentio, belongs
to Abraham.  However, Silentio exalts Abraham concerning his love, his striving, his
expectation of the impossible, and his faith in God.  Silentio probably wants to show
us the movement to faith as the movement from the great to the greater; from those
who love themselves to those who love others and greater than all are those who love
God.  And those who expect the impossible are like Abraham who expects the absurd
in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac and expectation to receive Isaac back.  Heraclitus
of  Ephesus  once  said  long  time  ago  concerning  faith:  “If  you  do not  expect  the
unexpected  you  will  not  discover  it;  for it  cannot  be tracked down and offers  no
passage” (Barnes, 1987, p.113).  To expect the unexpected is the point that Heraclitus
claims about faith, and we can see the similarity between Silentio and Heraclitus.  The
prophet Isaiah, in his warning to Ahaz, proclaims the character of faith: “If you do not
stand by me, you will not stand at all” (Isaiah 7: 9).  Let the angel remind us always:
for nothing is impossible to God.  
Silentio makes a comparison between the tragic hero and the knight of faith,
between  Agamemnon  and  Abraham.   Agamemnon,  the  commander  of  the  Greek
forces  in  the  Trojan  War,  has  to  sacrifice  his  daughter  Iphigenia  to  the  goddess
Artemis in order to calm the wind for his troops.  For Silentio, Agamemnon is the
tragic  hero  who  sacrifices  his  daughter  to  save  the  army.   In  his  sacrificing  his
daughter Iphigenia,  every one understands how much he has to sacrifice and how
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difficult  to  make a decision.   And everybody pays  respect  to  his  act  of  suffering
leading  to  the  triumph.   But  Agamemnon’s  tragic  hero  is  incompatible  with
Abraham’s the knight of faith.  Mark C. Taylor remarks of this distinction between
Agamemnon and Abraham: 
Agamemnon’s slaying of Iphigenia is an expression of civic duty.  His fellow
citizens  understand  his  impasse  and  empathize  with  the  agony  he  suffers.
Furthermore, they admire Agamemnon for his willingness to set aside personal
feelings and responsibilities for his daughter in order to secure the common good.
When understood within its  proper  social  context,  Agamemnon’s  deed is  not
horrifying but is completely reasonable…. Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac suspends
or transgresses the ethical in the name of something that surpasses or is exterior
to the entire moral  order.   Though faith is  not  unrelated to morality,  religion
cannot be reduced to ethics. (Taylor, 1993, p.79)    
For tragic hero, he knows that he acts according to the superior duty in which
he himself has to sacrifice something or someone he loves.  His act is not something
surpassed by the ethical sphere.  His ethical duty is within the universal.  He suffers
from his decision but it is the most reasonable for that moment.  The tragic hero is
great in his own way, and his name will never be forgotten.  Agamemnon is great in
his moral duty to the state, and his act is always understandable.  But it is not for
Abraham.  Silentio considers Abraham the knight of faith who suspends the ethical
sphere to God.  Morality does not contradict with faith, but faith could not be reduced
merely to ethics.  There must be a movement beyond the ethical sphere, this is why
Silentio entitled Problema I,  Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical? (FT,
III 104) and the suspension of the ethical to faith is the great paradox as he says:
“Faith is precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single individual is
higher than the universal, is justified before it, not as inferior to it but as superior…
that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the
absolute” (FT, III 106).  Agamemnon might have to make a tragic choice. Abraham
does not  encounter  the  tragic,  but  an  absolute  paradox.   This  supposes  to  be the
difference between Agamemnon and Abraham.  “The tragic hero relinquishes himself
in order to express the universal; the knight of faith relinquishes the universal in order
to become the single individual” (FT, III 124).  Agamemnon renounces himself for
the state through his moral duty and everyone recognizes his justification.  Abraham
sacrifices his beloved son Isaac because of his response “Here I am” to God, not to
save the nation or anything else.  He himself alone stands in his relation to God, and
at that point ethical  norms cannot be applicable.   It is not understandable and not
within the universality of reason.  Silentio says: “The knight of faith is assigned solely
to himself; he feels the pain of being unable to make himself understandable to others,
but he has no vain desire to instruct others” (FT, III 128).  For Silentio, this event is
only Abraham and for Abraham, not someone else.  And it is impossible for Abraham
to tell anyone about this event.  Silentio says: “Abraham cannot be mediated; in other
words, he cannot speak.  As soon as I speak, I express the universal, and if I do not do
so, no one can understand me” (FT, III 110).  He just keeps ‘the silence.’ And again
he adds: “Faith itself cannot be mediated into the universal, for thereby it is canceled.
Faith  is  this  paradox,  and  the  single  individual  simply  cannot  make  himself
understandable to anyone… The one knight of faith cannot help the other at all” (FT,
III 120).
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III
The important  part  of  Kierkegaard  whether  in  the  Postscript or  Fear  and
Trembling is his critical view of Hegel and other speculative thinkers who subsume
the individual a part of the system.  For him, faith is beyond an account of reason and
religious  experience  exists  in  relation  between  the  existing  individual  and  the
absolute.  For the case of Abraham, Silentio can speak about him in his many aspects
and shows us conditions  and movements  of faith.   But as for faith  itself,  Silentio
maintains ‘silence.’ Abraham maintains silence when he leaves his fatherland.  Before
he arrives at the mount in the land of Moriah, no one knows what he wants to do.
Sarah knows nothing and Isaac breaks the silence when it reaches the critical point.
Behind the scenes, only Abraham and his God know.  At this religious stage, this
suspension belongs to the absolute individuality.   Abraham, according to  Silentio,
seems to be a counter-Hegelianism as Butler says, “According to Kierkegaard, Hegel
fails to understand that the individual is higher than the universal ethical norm, that
there are times  when ethical  laws must  be ‘suspended’  or  ‘surrendered’  so that  a
higher  value  can  be  affirmed,  namely,  the  value  of  faith  –  which,  of  course,  for
Kierkegaard, is always an individual affair” (Butler, 1993, p.381).
This is the confrontation between Abraham and Hegel, the individual and the
totality.  Silentio probably views that the Hegelian system, in the end, will lead to the
destruction of faith rather than to support it.  Abraham, therefore, is the prototypical
person who moves beyond any system of thought.  Faith in any system of thought
seems  to  cease  to  be  faith  because  it  submits  to  be  understood  through  rational
explanation.  For Silentio, this is a wrong view about faith.  And some may ask what
faith  is,  what  is  the  proper  answer?   Silentio,  in  Fear  and Trembling,  just  takes
account  of  the  movement  of  faith  by  retelling  the  story  of  Abraham.   The  main
question in this project supposes to ask how to be the knight of faith rather than what
faith really is.  In this point, Abraham the knight of faith steps beyond the universal
ethical norms, and beyond Hegel’s system of thought.  To be a knight of faith, for
Silentio,  requires  a  prior  stage  of  infinite  resignation.   Silentio  says:  “Infinite
resignation  is  the  last  stage  before  faith,  so  that  anyone  who  has  not  made  this
movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do I become conscious
of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by virtue of
faith” (FT, III 96).  The knight of infinite resignation is a person who feels not at
home in  the  world  and  wants  to  renounce  everything  in  order  to  be  back  to  the
infinite.  His view of happiness in this world is incompatible with blissfulness in God.
“Infinite resignation is that shirt mentioned in an old legend.  The thread is spun with
tears, bleached with tears; the shirt is sewn in tears – but then it also gives protection
better than iron or steel….In infinite resignation there is peace and rest and comfort in
the pain, that is, when the movement is made normatively” (FT, III 96).  A knight of
infinite resignation could not be a knight of faith because he still could not stand on
the strength of the absurdity.  
For Silentio, “Through resignation I renounce everything….By faith I do not
renounce anything, on the contrary, by faith I receive everything exactly in the sense
in  which  it  is  said  that  one  who  has  faith  like  a  mustard  seed  can  move
mountains….By  faith  Abraham  did  not  renounce  Isaac,  but  by  faith  Abraham
received Isaac” (FT, III 98-99).  For those who could not stand on the strength of the
absurdity deserve not to be knight of faith.  Faith, for Silentio, is not a plain word and
can have an easy talk to anyone who stays in religion.  Infinite resignation is prior and
necessary  to  faith.   If  we  stop  there,  it  is  not  yet  faith.   Faith  is  like  a  double
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movement  from his renouncing of  everything,  and his  ‘strength of the  absurd’  of
receiving back everything.  A knight of infinite resignation does not mean one who
withdraws from the world.  He is not the one who lives an ascetic form of life.  On the
contrary, he is in the world as ordinary person like tax collector, and any person.  But
we could not find any means to judge him from outside.   He lives with high hopes to
attain the infinite but he seems to end with his conviction about this unattainable.  He
could not live and be satisfied with the perishable and finite things in the world.  He
could not accept the absurd with joy.  He could not climb up to the statement: for
nothing is impossible to God.  In the movement of faith, Silentio confesses: “But this
movement I cannot make.  As soon as I want to begin, everything reverses itself, and I
take refuge in the pain of resignation.  I am able to swim in life, but I am too heavy
for this mythical hovering” (FT, III 99). 
A knight of faith, according to Silentio, is the highest attainment and nothing
is higher.  Silentio accepts his limits and could not stand on ‘the strength of absurdity’
as a knight of faith.  He says, “For my part, I presumably can describe the movement
of faith, but I cannot make them.  In learning to go through the motions of swimming,
one can be suspends from the ceiling in a harness and then presumably describes the
movements,  but  one  is  not  swimming”  (FT,  III  88).   Silentio  just  describes  the
movement of faith like trainer who teaches us how to swim, but he himself can stand
only on the edge of swimming pool.  He could not take a leap into the absurdity.
What the best he can be is only a knight of infinite resignation.  This might be the
reason why he could not explain what faith is, and he realizes that he could not be like
Abraham, a knight of faith.  “He must be ‘silent’, for he cannot understand faith.  He
stands in awe before Abraham’s faith  and cannot comprehend it.   But,  though he
cannot directly state what faith is, Johannes can indirectly communicate the nature
and demands of faith, which he does by describing and celebrating Abraham through
retelling the story of Abraham’s trial of faith” (Kellenberger, 1997, p.12).  
A knight of faith is not a tragic hero who plays the most ethical significance
within the universal, and his act is always understandable for everyone.  A knight of
faith  is  not  a  knight  of  infinite  resignation,  but  infinite  resignation  is  the  prior
requirement of being a knight of faith.  A knight of infinite resignation just renounces
everything  he  loves  and  wants  to  cherish  and  could  not  take  the  additional  step
through the ‘strength of absurdity’  to grasp back all  what he renounces.  Silentio
seems to renounce everything through his infinite resignation but he dares not to take
this leap into the absurdity.  He merely admires at a distance Abraham who is able to
take this leap.  A man of faith is the one who can hold the ‘strength of the absurd’ and
carry  it  along  in  his  life  as  Abraham carried  it  through  his  whole  life.   Before
Abraham, Silentio stood with fear and trembling.  He might not have understood how
Abraham took his leap.  Faith, therefore, is possible when the movement of infinite
resignation takes a leap into the absurdity.  That is the paradox of why the particular
is above the universal; a knight of faith is above the tragic hero.  A tragic hero stands
on his moral  duty in the universal,  but  a knight  of faith takes a leap beyond the
universal  ethical  sphere.   Faith  is,  then,  beyond  the  ethical  dimension  or:  ‘a
teleological suspension of the ethical.’  A teleological suspension of the ethical to
faith allows the movement from infinite resignation to the state of being a knight of
faith.
For Butler, fear and trembling has to turn into the state of grace because as far
as we fear and doubt, we will still be far away from faith (Butler, 1993, p.380).  Doubt
and fear will move us from a state of grace and cause us to sink in the water like Peter
when he begins to fear the storm, whereupon Jesus said to him: ‘Man of little faith,
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why did you doubt?’ (Matthew 14: 34).  And with his disciples on a boat in the midst
of storm: ‘Why are you so frightened? How is it that you have no faith?’ (Mark 4:40).
These words might be in accord with what Silentio wants to express about faith in
Fear and Trembling.  Then the character of fear and trembling belongs to Silentio, not
Abraham.  Abraham continually lives his faith, and his response “Here I am” to God’s
demand of Isaac is beyond any category of reason.  For Silentio, a positive description
about faith in his  Fear and Trembling is: “The essential human is passion, in which
one generation perfectly understands another and understands itself….But the highest
passion in a person is faith….Faith is the highest passion in a person.  There perhaps
are many in every generation who do not come to faith, but no one goes further” (FT,
III 167).  Just as Silentio  was shocked when he encountered Abraham’s faith,  the
readers may be shocked when they encounter Silentio’s remarks about faith.  
IV
Kierkegaard’s philosophy is essentially related to his biography. He is clever
in transforming the problems of his life into his philosophy.  The problem of faith is
his deepest concern relating to both his family and the religious situation of the time.
And he proposes his ideas through pseudonyms in his indirect communication with
the reader.  We investigated here two main works from Climacus and Silentio.  Both
of them talked about faith, and they accepted faith as the absolute paradox.  Silentio
does not give us a positive description of faith but retells the story of Abraham, the
father of faith.  Climacus gives us some more positive accounts of faith in several
places.  But both of them have a crucial link in that: one has to set aside an intellectual
understanding to faith.  Faith is the absolute paradox, and the most we can do is to
understand that it is a paradox.  This is the main point where Kierkegaard departs
from traditional Christian thinkers like Augustine’s Credo ut intellegam, or Anselm’s
Fides quaeran intellectum. Kierkegaard, does not believe in order to understand, nor
does he see a role for faith in the search for understanding.  But according to him,
“faith begins precisely where thought stops.” For Kierkegaard, there is no bridge to
cross between faith and understanding.  For faith, we have to take a leap.  So if the
question is:  Is  faith  understandable?   Kierkegaard firmly holds on to the negative
answer to this question.  But a further question is: Is faith possible? Is it possible to be
Christian with Kierkegaard’s  view of faith?   For Kellenberger,  he might  say it  is
possible by seeing a person in the Bible like Mother Mary.  He says, 
 
Mary, like Abraham, is immured in silence.  It is for this reason that, as Johannes
says, no one can understand her.  And, like Abraham, she must therefore proceed
in anxiety.  This too Johannes brings out….Although Johannes does not make it
explicit,  Mary,  like Abraham,  believes and acts by virtue of the absurd.   She
trusts God absolutely.  She is joyful in the knowledge that she has been chosen.
(Kellenberger, 1997, p.55)
But if one asks the same question to Ricoeur, the answer might be different:
Surely the Christianity he described is  so extreme that  no one could possibly
practice it.  The subjective thinker before God, the pure contemporary of Christ,
suffering crucifixion with Him, without church, without tradition, and without
ritual, can only exist outside of history….To understand him one would need to
be able to grasp him unprecedented combination of irony, melancholy, purity of
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heart and corrosive rhetoric, add a dash of buffoonery, and then perhaps top it off
with religious aestheticism and martyrdom…. (Ricoeur, 1998, p.13)
Both  Kellenberger  and  Ricoeur  see  Kierkegaard  from  different  perspectives.
Kellenberger applies Kierkegaard’s faith with the other persons in the Bible whether
Job  or  Mary,  not  any  person  outside  the  Bible.   Ricoeur,  on  the  contrary,  puts
Kierkegaard’s view of faith applicable to common person in society and he sees that it
could not really be put into practice.  Ricoeur proposes to view Kierkegaard’s idea of
faith  relating  to  his  background,  his  reacting  to  Hegelian  and  Christendom  in
Denmark during his lifetime.  He lived during the time of the critique of ideology.
The organized Church and Hegel’s philosophical system are taken into criticism by
his  works.   Kierkegaard  wants  to  defend  and  differentiate  his  idea  of  faith  from
Hegelian system of thought because he views that speculative thought will lead to the
abolition of Christian faith.  He seems to bring Christianity back to its origins, an
acceptance of the absolute paradox of faith.  Christianity at that time, for him, seemed
too academic and losing the essence of faith.  For someone to become Christian was
too easy,  and involved an ignorance involving the difficult  nature of what being a
Christian really is.  
What it really means to be a Christian seems to be a question to which he
wishes to supply his own answer.  For him, to be Christian should come out of the
will  to  become,  which  begins  with  his  inwardness,  not  only  through  innately
hereditary or traditionally accepted.  It should be based on free decision to become
authentically  a  Christian.   He  may  see  that  being  a  Christian,  according  to  the
traditional manner, is too easy, and, does not result from any decision rooted in the
will to become.  Baptism at an early age, according to Climacus, is not the proper
because a child cannot know what to become a Christian is, and cannot decide for
himself.  Climacus says:
To become  a  Christian  then  becomes  the  most  terrible  of  all  decisions  in  a
person’s life, since it is a matter of winning faith through despair and offense.
An infant two weeks old cannot have passed the most terrible examination in this
life, one in which eternity is the examiner, even if it has ever so many Baptism
certificates from the parish clerk.  But for the baptized person there must also
come a later moment…when he, although a Christian, asks what Christianity is –
in order to become a Christian.  By Baptism, Christianity gives him a name, and
he is a Christian  de nominee;  but in the decision he becomes a Christian and
gives Christianity his name (nomen dare alicui [to give a name to someone]).
(CUP, VII 322-323)
To be  a  Christian  by name is  not  important  if  we never  live  our  lives  as
Christian.   To become  Christian  is  to  make  a  choice  to  be  truly  Christian.   The
significance of being Christian is not on what you are, but how you are.  Lip service
and what is traditionally accepted are not taken into account in being a Christian, and
Climacus suggests here that we need to begin through a free decision at the bottom of
our heart.  That is why Climacus said: ‘To become a Christian then becomes the most
terrible  of all  decision in a  person’s life.’   And again he says:  “But to  become a
Christian is  actually the most  difficult  of all  tasks,  because the task,  although the
same, varies in relation to the capabilities of the respective individuals” (CUP, VII
326).  Climacus challenges not only Kierkegaard’s Lutheran tradition but includes all
Christian tradition, not only in his situation but also the contemporary.  Before anyone
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makes decision to become Christian, according to Climacus, he has to know indeed
what Christianity is and is not.
For my part, I recognize Kierkegaard’s notions concerning faith as difficult
and challenging.  His task is not to proclaim what Christianity is, or what faith is.  He
uses indirect  communication with his  readers through pseudonyms concerning the
possibilities of becoming Christian and becoming a knight of faith.  He confessed that
he himself could not be a knight of faith and he could not call himself a Christian.  He
says, “The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a Socratic task, to
audit the definition of what it is to be a Christian – I do not call myself a Christian
(keeping the idea free), but I can make it manifest that the others are that even less
(Kierkegaard,  1978,  p.446).   His  Socratic  task  aims  at  not  giving  the  answer  to
become Christian but to make people aware of becoming Christian which is not just
public affair.  Kierkegaard wishes “to shake off “the crowd” in order to get hold of
“the single individual,” religiously understood” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p.452-453).  He
seems to show the movement from “the crowd” to “the single individual” and for him
“there is  in a  religious sense no public  but  only individuals” (Kierkegaard,  1978,
p.453).  For Kierkegaard,  people who have an easy and secure life as part  of the
public should awaken to think of themselves in order to live their lives guided by
their own wills even the will to become a Christian.  Climacus says, “Out of love of
mankind, out of despair over my awkward predicament of having achieved nothing
and of being unable to make everything easier than it had already been made, out of
genuine interest in those who makes everything easy, I comprehend that it was my
task: to make difficulties everywhere” (CUP, VII 155).  This seems to be Socratic
task  playing  the  important  role  in  Kierkegaard’s  thoughts.   If  we have to  accept
Kierkegaard’s notion of faith as the essential foundation of religion, religion will be
just an individual affair.  We could not reject that existing religion is an organized
institution,  and  its  structure  needs  to  have  an  organized  system of  thoughts  and
beliefs.  It is not just pure faith as in its beginning like Abraham’s story, but the point
we can learn here is that organized religion should not deny that religious experience,
in  the  end,  is  the  individual’s  relationship  to  God.   Yet  we  cannot  reject  social
dimension  of  religion.   Religion  could  not  be  just  a  public  or  private  affair.
Kierkegaard seems to challenge the systematic thought of the organized church by
putting more emphasis on faith.  When Silentio retells the story of Abraham and the
binding of Isaac, Levinas might not agree with him about his much emphasis only on
the first voice of God demanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.  Because Levinas thinks
that  the  second  voice  of  God  telling  Abraham  not  to  kill  Isaac  is  much  more
important:  “Do not  raise  your  hand  against  the  boy,  do  not  harm him”  (Genesis
22:12).  Levinas says, 
Kierkegaard was drawn to the biblical story of the sacrifice of Isaac.  He saw in it
an encounter between subjectivity raising itself to the level of the religious, and a
God elevated above the ethical order.  But the story can also be taken in a very
different sense.  The high point of the whole drama could be the moment when
Abraham lent  an ear  to  the voice summoning  him back to  the  ethical  order.
(Levinas, 1998, p.33)
This is the critical point between Kierkegaard and Levinas as Jeffrey Stolle
observes:  “Today  nobody  will  stop  with  faith;  they  all  go  further.”   This  was
Kierkegaard’s complaint.  “Today nobody will stop with ethics; they all go further.”
This is Levinas’s complaint, and it is his complaint with Kierkegaard as well” (Stolle,
2001,  p.132).   For  Levinas,  Kierkegaard’s  teleological  suspension  of  the  ethical
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seems to be not possible.  This is the main difference between Kierkegaard’s view of
faith and Levinas’s philosophy of ethics.  Levinas claims ethics as first philosophy,
prior  to  ontology  and  epistemology.   But  Levinas’s  ethics  is  not  in  the  Western
tradition  of  deontology,  utilitarian,  and virtue-based ethics.   Levinas  views ethics
differently, in such a way that there is a place for the singularity of the subject.  For
Kierkegaard,  Kantian  ethics  and  Hegelian  system  of  thought  have  no  place  for
subjectivity because we have to conform to the ethical laws which is applicable for all
human beings without realizing the differences among individuals.  For Kierkegaard,
faith could not be reduced to mere ethics in this sense.  That is why Abraham comes
to  the  point  of  his  suspension  of  ethics  for  something  higher.   Faith  is  beyond,
whether we call it irrational or super-rational, or an infinite passion of the finite for
the infinite, or the absolute surrender to the divine, or even a mystery.  I, for my part,
do not think that Kierkegaard wants to remove reason away from human affairs, he
just shows the sphere where reason cannot be applicable.  He challenges the church
and provides the alternative way for the individual commitment to religion surpassing
the religious structures in society.  Faith in Christianity is perhaps the one single idea
that  he  can  live  and die  for,  and because  of  his  inquiring  into  faith,  he strongly
challenges the church and Hegelian system of thought at that time.  Even I dare not
say  that  faith  is  irrational,  I  nevertheless  have  to  read  and  reread  carefully  his
reopening the difficulty notion of faith.  
Faith,  according to Kierkegaard,  is  not just  a common talk,  or what  many
people easily pay lip service to.  On the contrary, it is the highest attainment of life
which we have no language to positively describe.  For faith, he asserts that there is
nothing higher and we could not go further.  For those who attain faith like Abraham
could not express in word to other people, and for those who say about faith like
Silentio  and  Climacus  could  not  attain.   I  personally  realize  that  philosophers,
thinkers, or even theologians take the approach of Thomas, the Apostle, who wants to
prove Jesus’s resurrection by his saying: “Unless I see the holes and that the nails
made in his hands and can put my finger into the holes they made, and unless I can
put my hand into his side, I refuse to believe” (John 20: 25).  They would like to
consider God rationally.  Like Thomas, we always say ‘unless’ and ‘unless’ in order
to believe.  Jesus might perhaps be speaking to philosophers in general when he said
to Thomas: “Put your finger here; look, here are my hands.  Give me your hand; put it
into my side.  Doubt no longer but believe” (John 20: 27). “Doubt no longer but
believe” seems to be a hard thing for many thinkers who are always concerned with
epistemological or rational proof for their beliefs.  They perhaps cannot believe if
they cannot  prove rationally,  and for them understanding is  always  prior  to faith.
Kierkegaard partly walks in Augustinian tradition but he seems to end differently.  He
moves from Augustine’s ‘I believe in order to understand’ to ‘I believe because it is
not understandable.’  
Silentio believes the demands of faith are too high for him to fulfill, but he
does not deny the possibility in his reference to ordinary persons like a tax collector
for example.  Because we could not judge any other person concerning his faith from
outside  aspects,  it  exists  inwardly  in  his  individual  relationship  to  God.   Many
thinkers who always say ‘unless’ and ‘unless’ seem to be very far from faith.  Faith
might not be an object for intellectual exercise, but it is the way of life that people
live.  This is perhaps why farmers, fisherman, tax collectors, live their faith.  But it is
hardly for some thinkers as Jesus says: “I bless you, Father, Lord of heaven and of
earth, for hiding these things from the learned and the clever and revealing them to
mere children” (Matthew 11: 25).  Children here are representative of those who live
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their faith without any ‘unless.’  For these persons, Jesus says to them: “Happy are
those who have not seen and yet believe” (John 20: 29).  Happy are those who have
no doubt and believe: they live their faith.  I repeat again Silentio’s words: “faith
begins precisely where thought stops.”  As long as Silentio keeps thinking about faith,
he has not yet been the knight of faith even though he renounces all worldly things for
the kingdom of God.  Climacus, the wise and the learned, could not be a Christian
because  he  sets  so  many  conditions  of  becoming  a  Christian.   Kierkegaard
accomplishes his Socratic’s task: to make difficulty everywhere.  I, one of the readers,
could not hide myself  from these difficulties.  And I  cannot take refuge in merely
reading  his  works.  At  some  point  I  need  to  stop  thinking,  writing,  and  maintain
profound silence. And upon hearing the call of God, and my inner experience can
awaken me to respond “Here I am.” 
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are in use throughout this article referring to works by 
Kierkegaard.
CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Howard V. 
Hong & Edna H. Hong. (Eds. & Trans.). New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1992.
FT Fear and Trembling and Repetition. Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong. 
(Eds. & Trans.). New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
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1
 Some parts  of  this  paper were presented at  International  Conference on  Reasoning in Faith: Cultural
Foundations  for  Civil  Society  and  Globalization.  The  Council  of  Research  in  Values  and  Philosophy.
Catholic University of America, 15 September – 15 November, 2004.
2
 The Biblical  words through all  this  paper  quoted from  The Jerusalem Bible.  Alexander  Jones,  (Ed.).
(1966). New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
